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🚨 New TTP report: Up to 20% of top iOS VPN apps are linked to Chinese companies—some using shell corps, some even tied to Qihoo 360, a firm blacklisted by the U.S. for military ties.

Apps like Turbo VPN, VPN Proxy Master, and Thunder VPN are marketed globally but obscure ownership and jurisdiction—often pointing to HK, Singapore, or even Belize.

🔍 Key takeaway: VPN = trust. If your traffic routes through entities with opaque or hostile affiliations, your “privacy” could be an illusion.

Just because it’s in the App Store doesn’t mean it’s secure or ethical. Vet your tools. Share with your teams.

malwarebytes.com/blog/news/202

Malwarebytes · Popular VPNs are routing traffic via Chinese companies, including one with link to militaryUp to one in five of the most popular mobile VPNs are owned by Chinese companies that do their best to hide the fact.

I very often agree with Bruce Schneier. But not today.

If I wanted to make a private agreement through a digital trusted third party, why would I need an LLM?

The examples include comparing salaries. Instead of setting up (and later securely deleting) an LLM, we could just as easily run a function boiling down to
`return a > b;`

No need to involve LLMs with their uncertainty or possibility to do prompt injection.
#BruceSchneier #LLM #TTP
schneier.com/blog/archives/202

Schneier on Security · AIs as Trusted Third Parties - Schneier on SecurityThis is a truly fascinating paper: “Trusted Machine Learning Models Unlock Private Inference for Problems Currently Infeasible with Cryptography.” The basic idea is that AIs can act as trusted third parties: Abstract: We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them...
Schneier on Security · AIs as Trusted Third Parties - Schneier on SecurityThis is a truly fascinating paper: “Trusted Machine Learning Models Unlock Private Inference for Problems Currently Infeasible with Cryptography.” The basic idea is that AIs can act as trusted third parties: Abstract: We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them...

2025 Might Be A Difficult Year For Sino-Pak Ties

2025 Might Be A Difficult Year For Sino-Pak Ties

By Andrew Korybko

Here’s the full interview that I gave to VOA China’s FM Shakil on this subject, excerpts of which were published in their report on 20 January titled “安全和阿富汗问题将考验2025年中国与巴基斯坦的关系”

Sino-Pak ties officially remain excellent, but they appear to have been placed under a lot of strain over the past year. Pakistan’s inability to protect Chinese workers reflects poorly on its role in hosting the Belt & Road Initiative’s (BRI) flagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Where CPEC goes, so goes BRI, or so the perception is among some who consider this megaproject to be a bellwether of this global infrastructure network’s success. It’s little wonder then that China is concerned about its long-term viability.

The latest terrorist attacks in Pakistan are thought to be connected to Afghanistan due to reports that the “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP) and “Balochistan Liberation Army” (BLA) are operating out of that country with the tacit approval of the Afghan Taliban (simply the “Taliban”).

Some believe that the Taliban is using terrorist-designated groups as a means of asymmetrically compensating for their conventional military weakness vis-a-vis their former Pakistani patron with whom they’re feuding over the Durand Line, the British-imposed border between Afghanistan and what later became Pakistan, which the Taliban doesn’t recognize.

Regardless of their possible motivation in speculatively resorting to such means to balance Pakistan’s power, the fact of the matter is that these groups are creating a dangerous environment for CPEC, especially the BLA, which sometimes directly targets associated projects and Chinese workers.

The problem from China’s perspective is therefore two-fold: the Taliban is allegedly employing terrorist proxies against Pakistan, which is already troubling enough, but Pakistan is unable to adequately protect CPEC projects and Chinese workers, which is arguably due to its misplaced priority of cracking down on former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s PTI opposition party.

Both of these are outside of China’s direct ability to influence as has been seen. Its prior diplomacy in these regards hasn’t succeeded in getting Afghanistan to eschew such scandalous means for balancing Pakistan’s power, Pakistan continues prioritizing its crackdown on the opposition over its anti-terrorist interests, and ties between these neighbouring Chinese-friendly countries continue to deteriorate as proven by the latest tit-for-tat border violence.

If Afghan-Pak relations keep worsening, then China might consider informally curtailing investment into CPEC and possibly even freezing existing projects, including on unrelated pretexts if that happens and its representatives are pressed to publicly account for this in order to avoid the perception that it’s pulling back from BRI’s flagship project.

To add a twist to everything, Donald Trump’s return to the American Presidency might see him possibly provide some form of assistance to Pakistan’s latest anti-terrorist campaign, but on the condition that it pulls back from CPEC (also even if only informally) and provides the US with privileged investment and other opportunities to balance Chinese influence in the country.

His first term was characterized by his economic-driven transactional style so the precedent exists, though he might not ultimately propose such a deal, or it could also include the unacceptable condition of Pakistan curtailing its long-range ballistic missile program against which the former Biden Administration just imposed sanctions, including unprecedented ones against a state agency.

In any case, 2025 might be a difficult year for Sino-Pak relations due to Pakistan’s worsening domestic security situation caused by Afghan-based terrorists (especially the BLA) and Trump’s plans to more muscularly contain China, the latter of which could see him trying to apply more pressure on CPEC in order to discredit BRI as a whole (if the aforesaid upsurge in terrorism doesn’t do so first).

Excerpts from this interview were published in VOA China’s report on 20 January titled 安全和阿富汗问题将考验2025年中国与巴基斯坦的关系

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